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ABSTRACT 
Intermediate ruth values and the order relation "as true as" are interpreted. The 
material implication A ~ B quantifies the degree by which "B is at least as true as 
A. "" Axioms for the --, operator lead to a representation of  -, by the pseudo- 
Lukasiewicz model A canonical scale for the truth value of  a fuzzy proposition is 
selected such that the ~ operator is the Lukasiewicz operator and the negation is the 
classical 1 - .  operator. The mathematical structure of  some conjunction and 
disjunction operators related to --, are derived. 
KEYWORDS: fuzzy  logic, multiple-valued logic, implication, Lukasiewicz 
implication 
INTRODUCTION 
What does the value .7 mean in the assertion "the truth of P is .7," where P is 
the fuzzy proposition "Paul is tall"? We provide such a meaning based on the 
definition of the material implication and its mathematical representation. This 
paper focuses on the meaning and the representation f the material implication; 
a companion paper (Smets and Magrez [1]) studies its practical use. 
The definition of the logical operators between propositions, like the 
disjunction v and the conjunction A, are often derived from the negation -~ and 
the material implication --, as in the Frege-Lukasiewicz or the Lukasiewicz 
systems (Chauvineau [2]). A similar approach is followed here within fuzzy 
logic. 
Fuzzy logic is usually characterized by two components: the truth domain is 
the whole [0, 1] interval, and the truth value can be a fuzzy subset of [0, 1] 
(Mamdani and Gaines [3], Turner [4], Zadeh [5]). Only the first characteristic is 
considered here, reducing fuzzy logic to its multivalued logic component. 
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Furthermore, only propositions are considered; the problem of ~ within 
predicate logic is left aside. 
In the next section, the concept of a fuzzy proposition is presented. It is shown 
that some propositions can be neither strictly true nor strictly false but can admit 
some intermediate ruth values. 
In the third section, the semantics of the implication operator are discussed. 
The implication considered is Russell's material implication or Reichenbach's 
adjunctive implication. The basic interpretation of the implication is that the 
formula A ~ B is true when B is as true as A, and false when B is false and A is 
true. The full interpretation is that the degree of  truth of A ~ B quantifies the 
degree by which B is at least as true as A. 
In the fourth section, the negation unary operator ~ and the implication 
binary operator ~ and their axioms are introduced. The meaning of --1 P 
generalizes the classical interpretation "P  is false," and not "P  is refutable" or 
"P  is absurd" as in minimal ogic or intuitionistic logic (Grize [6], p. 210). We 
require that --, -~ P - P, whereas with the meanings "P  is refutable" or "P  is 
absurd" one has only P -4 -1 -1P and -~ P --' -1 -1 -~ P but not --1 --1P --, P. 
Conjunctions, disjunctions, and some properties of "-* are derived. Two 
different conjunctions are obtained. These conjunctions/disjunctions are de- 
duced from the --, operator but are not the only conjunctions/disjunctions 
available. Nothing is deduced about he representation f the AND operator in a 
proposition such as A.AND.B. 
In the concluding section it is deduced from the axioms of the "~ and 
operators and the properties of the T-norms (associative, symmetrical and 
monotone functions on [0, 1] x [0, 1] to [0, 1]; see appendix) that: 
1. There exists a canonical scale for the truth value of a fuzzy proposition. 
2. Within that canonical scale, the truth of A ~ B obeys the Lukasiewicz 
formula, that is, truth(A ---, B) = 1 - truth(A) + truth(B). 
3. The truth of ~A obeys the classical formula, that is, truth(~A) = 1 - 
truth(A). 
The relevant results of this paper are: 
1. The linguistic arguments presented to show that fuzzy propositions exist. 
2. A proposed efinition of the meaning of the material implication when its 
components are fuzzy propositions. 
3. A definition of a canonical scale on which the partial degree of truth of a 
proposition can be measured. It is based on the mathematical representa- 
tion of the material implication, itself deduced from the reasonable set of 
axioms presented by, among others, Weber [7] and Trillas and Valverde 
[8]. Such a canonical scale is capital for the use of fuzzy propositions. 
Indeed this canonical scale provides a meaning to the .7 value in the 
assertion "the truth of P is .7," where P is some fuzzy proposition. 
4. Some side results about conjunctions and disjunctions within material 
implications. 
These properties and some ideas developed in Gaines [9b] yield the construction 
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of a reference scale with which it is possible to evaluate the truth of any fuzzy 
proposition. This scale provides a tool to measure the degree of truth of a fuzzy 
proposition and the grade of membership of an element in a fuzzy set. It is 
studied in detail in Smets and Magrez [1]. 
FUZZY PROPOSIT IONS 
In fuzzy logic, one claims that the truth value ~,(P) of a proposition P is a 
predicate that can take values on the [0, 1] interval. The fact that the truth 
domain is not restricted to the classical true and false values is due to the fuzzy 
nature of some of the elements of the proposition. So the proposition P = 'Paul 
is tall' is true if h & Paul's height is 2 m, false if h = 1.4 m, but for h in 
between the truth will be intermediate. The structure of a truth that admits levels 
is the postulate of the proponents of fuzzy logic. But one could argue differently 
and try to discard the idea of fuzziness. The most obvious contender model is 
based on probability theory. 
A Probabilistic Alternative 
Suppose I am a sergeant in the army and my major asks me to bring him every 
morning all the tall men that have been recruited the day before. Let A be the set 
of tall men. I order the men according to their height and select all those that I 
consider "tal l ."  Thus there is some level y such that all men with a height above 
y are selected. Therefore "tal l" means "height above y , "  and an individual x 
with height h(x) belongs to the set A = "tal l" iff h(x) >_ y. Thus A is a crisp 
set. 
Evidently tomorrow the critical level y may change. This change can be 
considered as resulting from some random process. Let Y be that random 
variable with distribution Prob(Y ___ y). So x E A iff h(x) >_ y, and the 
probability that x E A is Prob(x E A) = Prob(Y _ h(x)). The random 
component in Prob(x E A) is the set A ; x is a well-defined man for whom we 
worry if he is tall or not. In this interpretation, A is a randomly varying crisp set. 
But this example proves only that when the sergeant must decide, he creates 
a (randomly selected) limit and uses "tal l" as a crisp (but randomly selected) 
set. Nevertheless, this does not prove that A is a crisp set. It proves that when a 
decision is required, the set A is transformed into a crisp set. In the absence of 
any decision, nothing is said. At the cognitive level, this probabilistic approach 
does not prove that "tal l" is a crisp set. 
The Fuzzy Alternative 
In order to justify the postulate that truth admits degrees, consider the 
following statement: "John is less tall than Paul." How should it be translated? 
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In the object language (Reichenbach [9a]), it means obviously that the height of 
John is smaller than the height of Paul: h(John) < h(Paul). But it can also be 
translated in a metalanguage as: " ' John is tall' is less true than 'Paul is tall ' ." 
An order relation (less than) can be defined in the object language (the height 
domain), but also in the metalanguage (the truth domain). 
Such a type of ordering based on the truth value instead of on the domain 
variable (the height) is not required in the present context. But consider the 
following English and French statements l: 
1. Paul is taller than John. 
2. Paul is more tall than John is obese. 
3. Paul is taller than John is obese. 
4. He was not so much angry as disappointed. 
5. Jean est plus bon que b~te. 
6. Jean est meilleur que b~te. 
7. Cet article est plus mauvais que scandaleux. 
8. Cet article est pire que scandaleux. 
Statements 1,2, 4, 5, and 7 are correctly formed, whereas tatements 3, 6, and 8 
are not. 
Statement 1 can be interpreted as above, with the order relation on the height 
domain. But this approach breaks down with the other statements. For statement 
2, the order relation compares height and weight! One has learned not to 
compare the noncomparable, but this is exactly what is done here. In fact, the 
comparison is based on "more tall" and not "taller" as in the incorrect 
statement 3. We interpret 2 as meaning "the fact that Paul is tall is truer than the 
fact that John is obese" or truth(Paul is tall) > truth(John is obese). The 
comparison is done on the truth domain, and the order relation is thus a binary 
relation with its two elements on the truth domain. This argument is supported 
by the fact that one uses linguistically "more tall" and not "taller." 
For statement 4, the only way to handle the comparison between these two 
hardly measurable properties (anger and disappointment) is by considering the 
truth of the two subpropositions and an order relation on the truth domain. The 
French statements mimic the situation described by statements 2 and 3, The use 
of special comparatives ("plus bon" instead of "meilleur," "plus mauvais" 
instead of "pire")  indicates the special nature of the comparisons. 2 
In fact in the famous and very purist French dictionary commonly called "Le 
Grand Robert," the author ejects as incorrect statement 5, claiming that "plus 
bon" may not be used (6 being of course also incorrect). But the statement"Jean 
est plus grand que b~te" is acceptable. We do not think the critic was 
appropriate, as there is no reason why the replacement of "grand" by "bon"  is 
Some of these statements were suggested to us by M. Dominicy. 
2 Prof. Arigoni has mentioned that he same differences a in statements 2 and 3, 5 and 6, and 7 and 8 
are encountered in Italian. 
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not allowable. The critic probably misses the analysis of statement 5 as 
composed of five words in the metalanguage: 1, 'Jean est bon'; 2, 'Jean est 
b~te'; 3, 'est'; 4, 'plus'; 5, 'que' (where the words in the object language written 
in italics are implicit). 
The approach based on the idea that the comparisons are based on the truth 
values of the propositions has the advantage that it satisfies the above correct 
statements. It is not necessary for statement 1,but it is for statements 2, 4, 5, and 
7. Therefore it is accepted hereafter that propositions admit ruth values and that 
the truth domain is not restricted to the two-valued omain {True, False} but to 
a much larger domain endowed with an order relation. As far as the truth value 
of the proposition P & "Paul is tall" is related to the height h of Paul, it seems 
acceptable that ~'(Plh) is a monotone nondecreasing function of h. The 
continuity of h induces the continuity of ~,. The truth value ~, is bounded above by 
True and below by False and can take infinitely many values between its bounds. 
Thus there exists a one-to-one transformation between the truth domain and the 
[0, 1] interval. 
THE SEMANTICS OF --~ 
The interpretation f the implication operator is hardly obvious. Intuition and 
common sense do not provide a clear answer. An interpretation is nevertheless 
required if one wants to use this operator in expert systems able to deal with 
approximate r asoning and some nonstandard logics. In classical binary logic, 
one can usually avoid the problem of the semantics of A ---' B as the rule of 
inference holds for all the interpretations of ~ .  But once one tries to be a little 
more general, problems appear immediately. For instance, in probabilistic logic 
(Reichenbach [10]), what meaning should be given to the assertion "the 
probability of A ~ B is p"?  Does it mean that P(B[A)  = p (conditional 
probability), that P(~A.OR.B)  = p (probability of a conditional), or that 
PA(B) = p where PA results from imaging on A (see Lewis [11]). 
For each truth-functional propositional operator, one defines an adjunctive 
and a connective interpretation (Reichenbach, [9a], p. 27 et seq.). Let * be any 
truth-functional propositional operator and consider the compound statement A 
• B. The adjunctive use of * corresponds tothe evaluation of the truth status of 
the compound statement A * B given the truth status of its elementary 
propositions A and B. The connective use of * corresponds tothe evaluation of 
the truth status of the elementary propositions A and B compatible with the truth 
status of the compound statement A * B. 
Negation is mostly adjunctive. (Knowing the truth status of A, one deduces 
the truth status of ~A .) In the connective interpretation, ~A would mean "A is 
necessarily false." 
The equivalence and the exclusive OR are used mostly in the connective 
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sense. (Knowing A ~- B is true, one deduces that either both A and B are true or 
both are false. Knowing A .OR.B is true, one deduces that either A or B is true, 
but not both.) 
The inclusive OR is used in both interpretations. 
The AND is used mostly in the adjunctive interpretation. (Knowing the truth 
status of A and of B, one deduces the truth status of A.AND.B.) 
In conversational l nguage, implication is usually used in its connective sense 
within an inference procedure (knowing the truth status of A ~ B, what can be 
said about he truth status of A and of B, in particular when the truth status of A 
is known as is the modus ponens?). Nevertheless in this paper, the implication 
operator is used with its adjunctive (or extensional) interpretation (what is the 
truth status ofA ~ B give the truth status of A and of B?). The implication in its 
connective sense corresponds toLewis's strict implication (it binds by necessity 
the consequent B to the antecedent A), whereas in its adjunctive sense it 
corresponds to Russell's material implication (it is a simple assertory junction 
between two propositions A and B). The material implication "A implies B"  
means that in fact one does not have simultaneously A true and B false. The 
strict implication "A (strictly) implies B"  means that one may not have 
simultaneously A true and B false, therefore if A is true, B is necessarily true 
(Blanch6 [12], p. 88). 
For any propositions A and B, the implication operator ~ in the formula A 
B relates an antecedent A to a consequent B. The syntax of ~ within fuzzy logic 
has been widely studied (Baldwin and Pilsworth [13], Bandler and Kohout [14], 
Domingo et al. [15], Dubois and Prade [16, 17], Mizumoto and Zimmermann 
[18], Trillas and Valverde [8], Valverde [19], Weber [7]). A semantical 
interpretation f --* is required in order to choose an appropriate mathematical 
model for its representation. I  Boolean logic (BL), in quantum logic (QL), and 
in intuitionistic logic (IL), A ---, B is interpreted as being respectively equivalent 
to -~A.OR.B (BL), equivalent to -~A.OR.(A.AND.B) (QL), or obtained by 
residuation (IL), that is, the truth of A --, B is the largest value in [0, 1] such that 
its AND combination with the truth of A is less than or equal to the truth of B 
(Dubois and Prade [17], TriUas and Valverde [8]). These equivalences ofA ~ B 
with other formulas might be acceptable in binary logic, essentially as the three 
representations happen to be identical. But there is no necessity that the 
definition of the implication in multivalued logic should mimic these formulas, 
especially as the three representations are not necessarily equivalent in these 
contexts. 
In this paper, we propose that the semantical interpretation of the material 
implication in "A ~ B is true" is that the consequent B is at least as true as the 
antecedent A. The degree of truth of A ~ B quantifies the degree by which B 
is at least as true as A. This degree of truth is not a binary variable that is 1 
when B is truer than A and 0 otherwise. It will indeed be 1 whenever B is truer 
than A, but when A is somehow a little truer than B the degree by which B is at 
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least as true as A is an intermediate value between 0 and 1, where the 0 will be 
reserved for the extreme case where A is strictly true and B is strictly false. This 
idea is similar to the concept of a measure by which a fuzzy set contains another 
fuzzy set. As for any definition, it is hard to justify this particular one, except by 
looking to its consequences and its power to resolve problems encountered with 
other definitions. 
This interpretation of --, is consistent with the definition of A --, B in each 
binary logic (BL, QL, or IL). But it somehow clarifies the difference between 
the adjunctive (where one builds the truth of A --. B as is the case here) and the 
connective implications (where one derives the truth status of A and of B). 
Furthermore it might help to avoid some confusion between different forms of 
implications. To say "B  is at least as true as A"  does not require any idea of 
causality (Hicks [20] argues that "A causes B"  if "A implies /}") or of 
relevance between A and B (as in the entailment concept of Anderson and 
Belnap [21]), two properties often implicitly assumed in the use of the 
implication in conversational language. 
Furthermore, the proposed interpretation of ---* clarifies the concept of false 
implication, even within the context of binary logic. "-1 (A --, B)"  means here 
"B  is less true than A , "  and the rule that permits us to infer -~ B from A and 
"- (A ~ B) is easy to understand (A is true and B is less true than A, so B is 
false, since there are only two truth values in binary logic). When ~ is 
interpreted as an implication in its connective sense, the concept of a false 
"implication" and the above deduction are hard to understand. Most of the 
problems related to the implication operator come, of course, from the absence 
of a clear intuitive meaning of the concept it represents. It is reflected by the 
more or less arbitrary way with which the case where -1A applies is handled in 
the truth table. Some might feel that "not(A implies B) ,"  "A does not imply 
B"  and "A implies --1B" are equivalent. Others might feel that the negation of 
"A implies B"  should be "nothing" (one claims either A ~ B or nothing, as is 
the case in PROLOG language) and not a rule like A.AND. ~B.  These 
difficulties do not exist with the proposed adjunctive interpretation of A --' B. 
This adjunctive interpretation is unrelated to the rule of modus ponens (MPR) 
where the truth of A --, B is given as with connective implications. Care should 
be taken here to restrict he meaning of the formula A --" B as being only a 
proposition that can have a truth status. The MPR is the rule of inference by 
which one can assert that proposition B is true (to a certain degree) once 
proposition A is true (to a certain degree) and proposition A ~ B is true (to a 
certain degree), where the implication is used with its connective interpretation. 
The and is not the propositional operator AND encountered in propositions like 
A.AND.B. Furthermore, the truth of B derived from MPR is not necessarily a 
function of the truth of A and of the truth of A ---, B (Magrez [22]), even if this 
truth functionality is usually accepted (Trillas and Valverde [23]). The rule of 
modus ponens is studied in a forthcoming paper. 
334 Philippe Smets and Paul Magrez 
Here only the adjunctive interpretation of ~ is considered. The entire 
discussion was given in the hope of clarifying the differences between the 
various forms and uses of --*. Most problems encountered in practice come from 
not considering these differences. 
Returning to the meaning of Prob(A ~ B) encountered in probabilistic logic, 
if A and B are crisp propositions, A ~ B can only be true or false and Prob(A 
---, B) = Prob(truth(A ~ B) = True) = Prob(B is at least as true as A) = 
Prob( --, A.OR.B). The other meaning of Prob(A ~ B) = Prob(B IA) is related 
to the rule of modus ponens, a consideration unrelated to the present study. The 
generalization f Prob(A ~ B) when A and B admit intermediate ruth values is 
not immediate, as the concept of the (crisp or fuzzy) probability of a fuzzy event 
is subjected to controversies that would lead us outside the present opic. 
IMPLICATION AND OTHER PROPOSITIONAL OPERATORS 
Implication 
Let ~,(A) be the truth value of proposition A. Let A ---, B denote the "material 
implication," with A being the antecedent and B the consequent. (We use the 
word "proposition" for "elementary proposition" and for "formula" obtained 
from propositions by some propositional operators.) 
In bivalued logic, p(A) E {True, False}. For the material implication, one 
has p(A --* B) = False if p(A) = True and v(B) = False, and p(A ~ B) = 
True otherwise. It corresponds in essence to the idea that the implication is true 
whenever the consequent is at least as true as the antecedent (and True is at least 
as true as both True and False, and False is only as true as False). 
In multivalued logic, v: II ---, A is a mapping from the set 11 of propositions to 
the truth domain A, where A is a linear bounded set of cardinality ~t ~ with 
maximal element True, minimal element False, and the order relation "at least 
as true as" symbolized by _>. Let T E I I  be the tautology and F E II be the 
contradiction with ~,(T) = True and v(F) = False. So for all A, B E 11, one 
has ~,(T) _ l,(A) _ ~,(F)and v(A) >_ v(B)or ~(B) _> u(A). The operator = in 
~(A) = v(B) means that both ~,(A) _> ~,(B) and p(B) >_ p(A) hold. 
For the material implication, ~,(A --. B) = True when l,(B) _> v(A), and v(A 
B) = False when p(B) = False and J,(A) = True. The cases not covered by 
these conditions are handled variously depending on the axioms added to the 
system. A classical postulate is the Lukasiewicz definition that we will study at 
length in this paper, but other formulas have also been proposed (Dubois and 
Prade [17]). 
As A is a bounded ordered set, there exists a strictly increasing relation w 
between A and the unit interval [0, 1] such that: (1) w o ~,(T) = 1; (2) w o I,(F) 
= 0; (3) ~,(A) _> ~,(B) is equivalent to w o I,(A) _ w o v(B). To be strictly 
correct, the same symbol __ should not have been used for the order relation on 
Implication in Fuzzy Logic 335 
A and the " larger or equal" relation on [0, 1], but the appropriate interpretation 
will be clear from the context. To simplify the notation, we define the function 
o: rI --* [0, 1] where v is w o v. In fuzzy logic, the whole unit interval is 
classically used as the domain of the truth value. The choice of such a domain is 
arbitrary but convenient. As there is no loss of generality, its adoption may not 
be criticized. Furthermore, we will call o(A) the truth value of A,  thereby 
shortcutting the real statement hat v(A) is the value obtained by the 
transformation on [0, 1] of the truth value of A, this last being defined in reality 
on A. 
The meta-operator - in A -= B means that the two propositions A and B are 
equivalent, in which case their truth values are equal: A -=- B implies that v(A) 
= v(B) and v(A) = v(B). 
Negation 
Let I-I be the set of propositions with the tautology T and the contradiction F. 
Le tv : I I  ~ [0, 1 ]w i thy(F )  = 0ando(T)  = 1. Fora l lA  E I - I ,v(A) isthe 
truth value of A. 
Let I I  be such that for all A E l-I there exists a negation A E II. (Both 
symbols A and ~A are used to denote negation.) One postulates that the 
negation A of a proposition A is a strong negation (Trillas [24]), that is, it obeys 
the following axioms: 
• NI:  v(A) is a function of v(A) 
• N2: 0(4)  > v(B) i f f  u(A) < v(B) 
• N3: ~-~A -A  
*N4:  -~T-  F 
These axioms are those of all classical negations. 
Given these axioms, there exists a strictly decreasing function n'[0, 1] --. [0, 
1] such that 0(4)  = n(v(A)) ,  n(0) = 1, n(1) = 0, n(n(a)) = a. I f  one further 
postulates that n is continuous, then n is a strong negation function. 
Trillas [24] has shown that for any strong negation function n, there exists a 
continuous trictly increasing function t:[0, 1] --* [0, 0o) such that t(0) = 0, t(1) 
< 0% and n(a) = t-  l(t(1) - t(a)). The often used negation function n(a) = 1 
- a corresponds to t(a) = a. 
To avoid cumbersome parentheses, we use the notations no(A) for n(o(A))  
and na for n(a), the letter n being used only as the symbol for the strong 
negation function. 
The Implication Axioms 
The following axioms are postulated for the implication operator ---,: 
• AI :  v(A ~ B) depends only on v(A) 
and o(B) truth-functionality 
• A2: v(A ---, B) = o(/~ ---, A)  contraposltive symmetry 
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• A3:  v(A ~ (B --* C))  = 
v(B ~ (A --, C)) 
• A4: v(A -'* B) >_ v(C -'* D) if v(A) <_ 
v(C) and/or v(B) > v(D) 
• A5: v(A ~ B)  = 1 i f f  v(A) < v(B) 
• A6: v(T ~ A)  = v(A) 
• A7: v(A -* B) is continuous in its 
arguments 
exchange principle 
monotonicity 
boundary condition 
neutrality principle 
continuity 
This set of axioms are those properties considered in Trillas and Valverde [8] 
that lead to the pseudo-Lukasiewicz formula for the ~ operator. The following 
discussion informally presents their meaning and consequences. 
The truth-functionality axiom A1 is usually the least criticized axiom, more 
because without it hardly anything could be formalized than because it is natural. 
It implies that v(A ~ B) can be represented bya function of v(A) and o(B). To 
simplify notation, let a = v(A), b = v(B), na = 0(4). Then A1 implies that 
v(A ~ B) = g(na, b) where g:[0, 1] × [0, 1] ~ [0, 1]. The use of na instead 
of a in the arguments of g simplifies later discussion (so defined g will be 
symmetrical). 
The contrapositive symmetry axiom A2 mimics the interrelation postulated 
between the modus ponens and the modus tollens. It means that if A is less true 
than B than/i is more true than/} in agreement with N2, but also that the degree 
by which B is at least as true as A is equal to the degree by which A is at least as 
true as B when v(A) > o(B). It implies that g(na, b) = g(nnb, na) = g(b, ha) 
as the negation is involutive. Therefore g is a symmetrical function. 
The exchange principle A3 corresponds tothe argument: " i fA  then (ifB then 
C)"  is equivalent to " i fA  & B then C" ,  where the & is a symmetrical truth 
functional conjunction. Axiom A3 is used instead of some axioms based on the 
& operator, as otherwise it would have been necessary to define &. Instead, 
axiom A3 will be used in order to define later on the meaning of the & operator. 
Axiom A3 implies that g(na, g(nb, c)) = g(nb, g(na, c)); therefore g is 
associative. 
The monotonicity axiom A4 is based on the idea that if the truth of the 
antecedent decreases and/or the truth of the consequent increases, then the truth 
of the implication does not decrease, as the implication is essentially a measure 
of the fact that the consequent is more true than the antecedent. Axiom A4 
implies that g(a, b) is nondecreasing in its arguments. 
The boundary condition A5 claims that the implication is true iff the 
consequent is at least as true as the antecedent. I  implies g(na, b) = 1 iffa _< b. 
The " i f "  part corresponds to the fundamental property of the material 
implication as described in multivalued logic (see section on implication). The 
"only if" part rejects cases where an antecedent A somehow more true than a 
consequent B could nevertheless imply B strictly (i.e., with a truth value T). 
With the interpretation f v(A ~ B) as the degree by which B is at least as true 
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as A, it seems natural to claim that this degree should be less than 1 whenever A 
is truer than B. The identity principle o(A ~ A) = 1 is a particular case of 
axiom A5 that covers the if part but not the only if part. This last is necessary to 
prove that the implication and the negation share the same generator (see 
theorem 2). 
The neutrality axiom A6 tells us that the degree by which the tautology 
implies A is nothing but the degree of truth ofA.  As n(1) = 0, it implies g(0, a) 
= a. Given the contrapositive symmetry axiom A2, one has v(A ~ F)  = o(fl). 
One has also g(0, 0) = 0; thus the second case covered by the rule for material 
implication in multivalued logic must not be explicitly postulated (see 
"Implication' '). 
The continuity axiom A7 is justified by the fact that discontinuity seems 
unnatural. A small variation in the truth of an element of the implication should 
not lead to a large variation in the truth of the implication. 
From axioms A1 to A7, one deduces that g is a continuous Archimedian 
nilpotent S-conorm with g(a, b) = 1 if na <_ b (Theorems 1and 2). Definitions 
and properties of the T-norms and S-conorms are given in the appendix. 
THEOREM 1 Given A1 to AT, the function g:[0, 1] x [0, 1] ~ [0, 1] that 
quantifies the truth value o f  the implication A ~ B is a continuous 
Archimedian S-conorm with g(na, b) = 1 i f  a < b. 
Proof Let a = o(A) and b = v(B) with a, b E [0, 1]. By A1 there exists a 
function g:[0, 1] x [0, 1] ---, [0, 1] quantifying the truth value ofA ~ B that 
depends only on a and b. By A2, g is symmetrical. By A3, g is associative. By 
A4, g is monotone in its elements. By A6, g(0, a) = a. Therefore g is an S- 
conorm. By A5, g(na, b) = 1 if a _< b. By A7, g is continuous, and 
continuous S-conorms atisfying the identity principle are Archimedian. [] 
As g is an Archimedian continuous S-conorm, there exists an additive generator 
f of g with f being a continuous trictly increasing function f :  {0, 1 } ~ [0, 0o] 
and g(a, b) = f - ( f (a )  + f(b)), where f -  is the generalized inverse o f f .  
THEOREM 2 Under the conditions o f  Theorem 1, the generator t o f  the 
strong negation n and the generator f o f  g are equal (up to a 
proportionality factor). 
Proof By Theorem 1, o(A ~ A) = 1 can be represented byf - ( f (na)  + 
f(a)) = 1. Suppose there exists a proposition B with b = o(B) such that nb 
< naandf(nb) + f(a) > f(1). Theng(nb, a) = 1, and thus o(B ~ A)  = 1 
with o(B) > o(A) in contradiction with the only part of axiom A5. So 
whenever nb < na, f (nb) + f(a) < f(1). Then fo  f - ( f (nb)  + f(a)) = 
f (nb) + f(a) for all b > a. By the continuity ofn  and f ,  and o(A ~ A)  = 1, 
one has f o f - ( f (na)  + f(a)) = f(na) + f(a) = f(1). Therefore na = 
f - ( f (1 )  - f(a)) = f - l ( f (1 )  - f(a)) as f(1) - f (a) E [0, f(1)]. As the 
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representation na = t-  t(t(l) - t(a)) is unique up to a multiplicity factor, one 
has f = t up to a multiplicity factor. [] 
Theorem 2 implies that the g and n functions share the same generator. The 
negation being strong, t(0) = 0 and t(1) < o% and therefore f(0) = 0 and f(1) 
< oo and g is thus nilpotent. Under those conditions, 
and 
na =f  - l ( f(1) - f (a ) )  
g(na, b) =f -  l({f(1) - f (a )  +f(b)} A f(1)) 
It might be argued that the set of axioms have been selected on an ad hoc basis in 
order to derive the Lukasiewicz operator. We feel that this axiomatic approach is 
useful in that it clarifies the requirements hat lead to the Lukasiewicz operator. 
Their value can be judged only by the examination of their naturalness, a highly 
subjective criterion, of course. We feel these axioms sufficiently convincing to 
justify their acceptance. This approach also has the advantage that if one tries to 
use another operator for the ---,, at least one of the axioms will be unsatisfied. 
The knowledge of which axiom is rejected might lead to a reexamination f the 
foundations of the proposed operator and its appropriateness. 
Conjunction 
Conjunction can be introduced through the implication rules. Axiom A3 v(A 
(B ~ C)) = v(B ~ (A --* C)) is based on the idea that " i fA  then (ifB then 
C)"  is equivalent to " i fB  then (ifA then C) ."  They correspond to " i fA  & B 
then C ,"  where & denotes a conjunction. 
As two different conjunctions will be encountered, two symbols &~o and &o 
are defined, where the choice of subscript reflects the fact that their 
corresponding operators will turn out to be the To,- and T0-norms. 
The axioms for the conjunction &o, presently considered are: 
• Cl: v(A --, (B ~ C)) = v((A&o,B) ~ C) 
• C2: There is a function T:[0, 1] × [0, 1] --* [0, 1] such that v(A&o,B) = 
T(o(A ), v(B)) 
We prove that T is the T-norm n-dual of the S-conorm associated with the 
implication. 
TrIF-OREM 3 The T function in C2 is the T-norm n-dual o f  the S-conorm g 
associated with the implication. 
Proof Let C - F in axiom C 1. By A6 and A2, B ~ F - B. Then axiom C 1 
becomes g(na, nb)= g(n T(a, b), O) = n T(a, b). So Tis the n-dual of the S- 
conorm g. Let C :# F. By the associativity of g, one has g(na, g(nb, c)) = 
g(g(na, nb), c) = g(nT(a, b), c), and axiom C1 is satisfied. [] 
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Another conjunction can be defined from the postulate " i f  A implies B, than 
A implies both A and B . "  The axioms for this &0 conjunction are (A is the 
minimum operator): 
• c3 :0 ( (4  --, B )  --, (,4 --, ,4&0B) )  = 1 
• C4: There is a function F:[0, 1] x [0, 1] --* [0, 1] such that v(B&oC) = 
F(v(B), v(C)) 
• C5: v(B&oC) <_ v(B) A v(C). 
C5 means that the truth of the conjunction cannot be larger than any of its 
components. 
THEOREM 4 Given C3 to C5, F is the To-norm. 
Proof Axiom C3 corresponds tog(na, F(a, b)) > g(na, b) with a = v(A), 
b = v(B), and F(a, b) = v(A&oB). If a _< b, the inequality becomes g(na, 
F(a, b)) = 1. The only if part of axiom A5 implies that F(a, b) = a. If a > b, 
the inequality becomes g(na, F(a, b)) >_ g(na, b) < 1. In that domain of g, 
g is increasing in its arguments, thus F(a, b) >_ b. Therefore F(a, b) >_ a A 
b. By axiom C5, F(a, b) <_ a A b. Thus F(a, b) = a A b. [] 
Axiom C3 could have been: (A ~ B) ~ ((A -* C) ~ (A ~ (B & C))) is 
true. As C3 is a particular case of it when A - B, the present & and the one in 
C3 are the same. The & is thus quantified by a T0-norm. One proves that the T0- 
norm indeed satisfies this relation. 
THEOREM 5 v((A -" B) ~ ((14 ~ C) -+ (A --' (B & C)))) = 1 i f f  the & is 
represented by a To norm. 
Proof Let a = v(A), b = v(B), c = v(C) and suppose v(B & C) = b ^ c. 
For the if part, we must prove that g(ng(na, c), g(na, (b A c))) >_ g(na, b). 
(a) If b ___ c, the inequality becomes 1 > g(na, b) and is satisfied. 
(b) If  b < c, the inequality becomes g(nx, y) _> y which is true as g is an 
S-conorm. 
The only if part of the theorem is proved by posing A -- B, in which case we 
obtain axiom C3 and Theorem 4 applies. [] 
At first sight, it might seem strange that &,. and &0 are not represented by 
identical operators. One can represent C1 and C3 through the relation 
v({(A--'B)&~(,4--, C)} --' {A ---' (B&o C)}) = l (I) 
C 1 is used to define &~,. C3 is deduced when C m A. 
In fact, nothing requires that &., and &o be the same &. With crisp 
propositions, the distinction is irrelevant, as on {0, 1} they are equivalent 
operators. The difference appears only with fuzzy propositions. But it should be 
remembered that in fuzzy sets theory, the unicity of the conjunction operator has 
never been required. Furthermore, it has generally been proposed that the & 
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operator has to be adapted to the semantic requirements, which happens to be the 
case here. 
When B -- C, relation (1) becomes ((A ~ B)&®(A ~ B)) ~ (A ~ B) as the 
&o is idempotent (To(a, a) = a A a = a). This statement is indeed true, since 
Too(x, y) <- x A y and (A ~ B) ~ (A -~ B) is always true by the identity 
principle (cf. Axiom AS). 
FURTHER PROPERTIES 
Some of the fundamental theorems encountered in defining implication will 
now be examined. 
The transitivity of the implication can be proved: 
THEOREM 6 The transitivity of  the implication is true: 
u((A ~ B)~((B~C)--*(A--*C)))= 1 
Proof One must prove that T(g(na, b), g(nb, c)) <- g(na, c), where Tis the 
T-norm n-dual of the S-conorm g (see theorem 3). (V is the maximum 
operator.) 
Since nx = f - ( f (1 )  - f(x)),  g(x, y) = f - ( f (x )  + f(y)), then 
g(na, c) =f- ( f  o f -  {f(1) -f(a)} + f(c))  =f - ( f (1 )  - f (a )  + f(c)), 
ng(x, y) =f- ( f (1 )  - f  o f -  {f(x) +f (y})  =f-({f(1)-f(x) - f (y )}  v 0), 
and 
ng(nx, y) =f-  (f(1) - f  o f -  { f  o f - [ f ( l )  - f (x ) ]  +f (y )})  
=f- ({ f (x ) - f (y )}  V 0). 
As T(x, y) = ng(nx, ny), 
T(g(na, b), g(nb, c))=ng(ng(na, b), ng(nb, c)) 
=f- ( f (1 ) -{ f (a ) - f (b )}  v 0 -{ f (b ) - f (c )}  v 0). 
Depending on the order of a, b, and c, and g ivenfandf -  are increasing, one 
obtains the following relations: 
4 
• Let a _> b > c, thenf - ( f (1 )  - f(a) + f(c)) = g(na, c). 
• Leta >- c >_ borc  >_ a >- b, thenf - ( f (1 )  - f (a )  +f(b) )  <_ g(na, c). 
• Letb >- a >_ corb  >_ c >- a, thenf - ( f (1)  - f (b )  +f(c))  <_ g(na, c). 
• Let c -> b _> a, thenf - ( f (1 ) )  = g(na, c) = 1. 
In each case the required relation is satisfied. [] 
Remark By taking A --- T and using axiom C1, one obtains o(C) >_ 
v(B&o~(B "~ C)), which would reduce to the disjunctive syllogism ifB and C 
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were crisp and B ~ C was represented by B.OR.C as in Boolean logic. The 
relation corresponds to the basic condition for the truth-functional modus 
ponens as described in Trillas and Valverde [23]. 
The following theorems can be proved (the proofs are left to the reader). 
THEOREM7 v(A -~ (B -~ A))  = 1. 
Usually such a theorem is considered paradoxical, as it seems to mean that a true 
proposition is implied by any proposition. The paradox comes from the 
confusion between the adjunctive and the connective interpretations of the 
implication. But if the truth of an implication is interpreted with its adjunctive 
sense as a measure of the truth that the consequent is as true as the antecedent, 
then the paradox disappears. Theorem 7 reflects only that v(B --" A )  >_ v(A), a 
true property as g is an S-conorm. 
THEOREM 8 v((A --' (B -* C)) --" ((A -* B) -" (A --" C))) = I. 
THEOREM 9 v(A "-' (B -~ (A&oB))) = 1. 
Given C1, this theorem can also be written as v(A&~B --, A&oB) = 1. The 
second & is necessarily &o. Indeed, when A -= B, the theorem becomes v(A --, 
(A --' A&oA)) = 1, which is acceptable iffthe & operator is idempotent. I f the 
& were not idempotent, then v(A & A)  < v(A) by C5, v(A --" A & A)  = ~ < 
1, and we might have v(A --, (A - - 'A  &A) )  < 1 ifot < v(A) < 1. 
THEOREM 10 v(A & B -, A )  = 1. 
This is true whatever the & operator, as the truth of a conjunction should never 
be larger than the truth of its components. Theorem 10 could have been 
postulated in place of C5. 
T~EOREM 11 v((A - '  B ) -~ B) = v ( (B - ,  A) - - ,  A).  
The Disjunction 
THEOP.EMI2 v(A ~ (A  VB)) = I. 
This is true whatever the v operator, as the truth of a conjunction should never 
be smaller than the truth of its components. The disjunction operator V is 
uniquely defined f rom the ~ conjunction o f  Theorem 10 i f  one accepts that 
they obey de Morgan's laws: -1 (A v B) mE A & 1~ and -1 (A & B) --- ,4 V l~. 
Indeed due to axiom A2, Theorem 12 is equivalent to v(,4 & B - - ' / ] )  = 1. 
THEOREM 13 t,((A --' C) -'* ((B "-' C) --' ((A VoB) - '  C))) = I. 
The true proposition could be rewritten as {(A - ,  C)&®(B ~ C)} --, {(AVoB) 
--' C}. That the disjunction is v0 can be seen when A =, B - C, and the 
proposition becomes {(A --, A)&®(A --, A)} ---, {(AVoA) --, A}. To be 
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correct, A v0A should never be more true that A, and this is obtained only with 
the idempotent disjunction v(A v0B) = v(A) V v(B), where V is the maximum 
operator. 
THEOREM 14 v((A ~ B) ~ B) = v(A ) v v(B). 
Proof Let a = v(A) and b = v(B). From the proof of Theorem 6, v((A 
B) ~ B) = g(ng(na, b), b) = f -{ f  o f - [ ( f (a )  - f(b)) v 0] + f(b)} = 
f -{ [ ( f (a )  - f(b)) v 0] + f(b)} = f -{ f (b )  vf (a )}  = a V b as f i s  
monotone increasing. [] 
Remark One should note that P --* Q is not equivalent to 15 v Q when the 
disjunction v is represented by the Vo operator. It is equivalent to/~ V Q if the 
disjunction v and the g function of -* are represented by S~.-conorms. 
Nevertheless, from Theorem 14, (P ---, Q) ~ Q is equivalent to PVoQ, but this 
relation can hardly be used as a meaningful definition of a disjunction. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Axioms A1 to A7 for the material implication operator have permitted the 
derivation of a pseudo-Lukasiewicz operator, that is, there exists an arbitrary 
strictly monotone continuous transformation of the truth value of the proposi- 
tions such that the ~ operator obeys the Lukasiewicz rule of implication. 
Let a = 0(,4) and b = v(B). It is proved that the implication and the negation 
operators can be generated by any member of the set of the bounded continuous 
monotone increasing functions f:[0, 1] ~ [0, 00)with f(0) = 0 and f(1) < oo, 
such that 
and 
v(A ~B)  =f - ' ({ f (1 )  - f (a )  +f(b)} A f(1)) 
v( f t )=f - l ( f (1 ) - f (a ) )  
Thisfgenerator is defined up to any strictly monotone transformation. As the 
truth scale o(,4) is also defined up to any strictly increasing monotone 
transformation, one can create a canonical scale for the truth value 0(,4) of a 
proposition such thatf(v(T)) = f ( l )  = 1 andf(v(A)) = f(a) = a. In that case, 
one derives the Lukasiewicz operator for the material implication operator v(A 
--* B) = (1 - v(A) + v(B)) ^  1 and the classical negation operator v(/i) = 1 
- v (A) .  
The mathematical structure of some conjunction and disjunction operators 
related to the ~ operator are derived. Two different conjunction operators are 
obtained depending whether they operate on propositions located before or after 
the -~ operator. In the statement ((A -'* S)&o,(A ~ C)) ~ (/1 ~ (O&oC)), 
Theorem 3 shows that the first conjunction &~ is the T~-norm as the g function 
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is an S.,-conorm on the canonical scale, and Theorem 4 shows that the second 
conjunction &o is a T0-norm. This discrepancy between the two conjunctions i
not paradoxical; the unicity of the representation f the conjunction has never 
been postulated within fuzzy logic. Analogous properties can be extended to 
disjunctions as they are related to the conjunctions through de Morgan's laws. 
These properties do not provide any information concerning the structure of 
other conjunctions/disjunctions like the AND in A.AND.B. Even relation (1) 
with A being a tautology just tells us that (B&**C) '-' (B&oC), that is, that 
B&oC is at least as true as B&ooC, which is indeed true whatever T-norna is used 
for &o.. It does not support any model for other conjunctions. 
The disjunctive syllogism v(B) >_ v(A&®(A ~ B)) discussed in the remark 
following Theorem 6 becomes o(B) >_ v(A) ^  v(B) on the canonical scale, a 
result coherent with the definition of v(A ~ B) as the degree by which B is as 
true as A, but not useful from a practical point of view. 
The canonical scale could be used as a tool to define what a proposition with a 
truth value of a is. Following the idea presented in Gaines [9b], the proposition P 
such that v(P) = v(P) will have a truth value v(P) = .5, the proposition Q such 
that v(Q) < v(P) and v(O_. ~ Q) = v(P) will have a truth value of o(Q) = .25, 
etc. This approach is further studied in Smets and Magrez [1]. 
In summary, the following have been successively considered: 
1. There are fuzzy propositions that admit intermediate degrees of truth. 
2. The truth domain is a bounded ordered set. 
3. The implication A ~ B is a formula for which the degree of truth is equal 
to the degree by which B is at least as true as A. 
4. The negation is represented by a strong negation. 
5. Axioms A1 to A7 for ---' imply that the truth of A --* B is represented by a 
pseudo-Lukasiewicz function. 
6. Due to the arbitrariness of the numerical scale used to represent the truth 
value of a proposition, one can select a canonical scale such that the 
negation is represented by the classical 1 - .  operator and the ~ by the 
Lukasiewicz operator. 
7. Conjunction and disjunction operators related to the ~ operator are 
described, conjunction in the antecedent being the T**-norm on the 
canonical scale, and conjunction in the consequent being the T0-norm. 
A canonical scale is thus provided that gives its meaning to the .7 values in 
assertions "the truth of P = .7." Indeed, if one hopes to use a multivalued truth 
domain, a meaning has to be provided to each value in the domain, that is, one 
must provide a set of propositions whose truth values are uniquely defined on the 
truth domain. Any new propositions would then be compared with those 
reference propositions and their truth evaluated through comparison. This 
approach is identical with the one used by subjective probabilists, who define 
that the subjective probability of a proposition is p if one would be indifferent 
between betting on the truth of the proposition or on the fact that a ball randomly 
344 Philippe Smets and Paul Magrez 
selected from an urn with a proportion p of white balls would be white. The 
meaning of  a subjective scale is in its measure. The proposed canonical scale 
is the underlying tool on which one will quantify the truth of some reference 
proportions. This construction is given in detail in Smets and Magrez [1]. 
APPENDIX  
T-Norms and S-Conorms 
The concept of T-norms and S-conorms is developed fully in Schweizer and 
Sklar [25-27] and Weber [7]. 
DEFINmON 1 A T-norm is a function T f rom [0, 1] x [0, 1] to [0, 1] such 
that for  all a, b, c, d, E [0, 1], one has: 
1. T(a, b) = T(b, a) symmetry 
2. T(a, T(b, c)) = T(T(a, b), c) associativity 
3. T(a, b) > T(c, d) i f  a >_ c and b > d monotony 
4. T(a, 1) = a boundary conditions 
A T-norm is called Archimedian i f f  
5. T is continuous 
6. T (a ,a)  < a 
An Archimedian T-norm is called strict i f f  
7. T is strictly increasing in each of  its places. 
We remark that 7 implies 6. 
An S-conorm is a function S:[0, 1] × [0, 1] ~ [0, 1] (Archimedian or 
stricO i f f  S has the same properties as a T-norm with the modifications: 
4' .  S(a, O) = a 
6 ' .  S(a, a) > a 
Ling [28] proved that for any Archimedian T-norm, there is a decreasing and 
continuous function h:[0, 1] -* [0, ~] with h(1) = 0 such that 
T(a, b)  = h-(h(a) + h(b)) 
where h- is the pseudo-inverse of h, defined by 
Ih - l (y )  i f y  E [0, h(0) ] h- (y )= 0 i fy  E [h(0), ~]  
Moreover, Tis strict iffh(0) = ~ in which case h- = h- 1. When h(0) < Q*, T 
is said to be nilpotent. This h function is called the (additive) generator of T. 
A similar result holds for Archimedian S-conorms, except hat the (additive) 
generator f of S is increasing with f(0) = 0 and with the pseudo-inverse f -  o f f  
such that 
[ f - l (y )  i f yE  [O, f ( l ) ]  
f - (Y )= i fy  E [f(1), ~] 
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If  S is strict, f (1)  = oo and f -  
Note that 
and 
h-  (h (x)) = x, 
= f -  1. If f (1)  < 0% S is said to be nilpotent. 
h(h-(y)) = min(y, h(0)) 
f -  (f(x)) = x, f ( f -  (y)) = rain(y, f ( l ) )  
For any T-norm T and S-conorm S, one has 
Tw(a, b)<_ T(a, b)~ To(a, b) 
Sw(a, b)>_S(a, b)>-So(a, b) 
where Tw, To, Sw, and So are T-norms and S-conorms uch that 
a i fb=l  
Tw(a, b)= b i f a= l  
0 otherwise 
To(a, b)= a A b 
! i fb=O 
Sw(a, b) = if a = 0 
otherwise 
So(a, b)=a v b 
where ^  (v) denotes the minimum (maximum) operator. 
The To,-norm and S,,-conorm are defined as: 
T®(a,b)=(a+b-1)vO;  S**(a,b)=(a+b)A1 
Negation 
A function n:[0, 1] ~ [0, 1] is called a negation (function) iff 
1. n(0) = 1, n(1) = 0 
2. n(a) <_ n(b) if a _> b monotonicity 
A negation is strong iff 
3. n(a) < n(b) if a > b strict monotonicity 
4. n is continuous 
A strong negation is an involution iff 
5. n(n(a)) = a for all a E [0, 1] 
For any negation, 5 implies 3, and n-~ = n. 
Trillas [24] proved that any strong negation function n can be generated from 
a continuous trictly increasing function ,p from [0, 1] to [0, oo) such that ~(0) = 
0 and ,p(1) < oo and n(a) = ~o-l(~(1) - ~(a)). In order to simplify the 
notations, we will write na for n(a) droping the parentheses whenever possible. 
To any T-norm T and a strict negation  is associated an S-conorm defined as 
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S(a, b) = n(T(na, nb)). S is called the n-dual of T. If T is Archimedian with 
generator h, then S is Archimedian with generator f = h o n. 
Analogous results can be described when starting from Archimedian S- 
conorms S and deriving the Archimedian T-norm T n-dual of S from T(a, b) = 
n(S(na, nb)). 
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